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Public Health Chronicles
Lessons Learned from
the 1918–1919 Influenza
Pandemic in Minneapolis
and St. Paul, Minnesota
Miles Ott, AB
Shelly F. Shaw, MPH
Richard N. Danila, PhD, MPH
Ruth Lynfield, MD

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it.

— George Santayana
Spanish Influenza of 1918–1919 killed more than 50
million people worldwide over the course of two years.1
The true origin of the 1918 influenza pandemic is
unknown. During World War I, propaganda in warengaged countries only permitted encouraging news, so
as a neutral party, Spain was the first country to publicly
report on the health crisis.1 Thus, Spanish Influenza
became a popular term. However, historical research
has shown that Spain was an unlikely candidate as the
initial source and some suggest that it originated in
Kansas in the spring of 1918.
Influenza pandemics have occurred regularly every
30 to 40 years since the 16th century. Today, influenza
experts consider the possibility of another influenza
pandemic, not in terms of if but when. Due to the
high likelihood of an influenza pandemic, planning is
underway in many U.S. states and other countries. We
reviewed the responses of two neighboring Minnesota
cities during the 1918–1919 pandemic to gain insight
that might inform planning efforts today.
Many of the components of current pandemic
influenza plans were utilized to some degree in Minneapolis and St. Paul during 1918–1919. Coordination
between different levels and branches of government,
improved communications regarding the spread of
influenza, hospital surge capacity, mass dispensing of
vaccines, guidelines for infection control, containment
measures including case isolation and closures of public places, and disease surveillance were all employed
with varying degrees of success. We focus on medical
resources, community disease containment measures,
public response to community containment, infection
control and vaccination, and communications.

PANDEMIC BEGINNINGS IN MINNESOTA
Minnesota’s first Spanish Influenza cases were identified in the last week of September 1918. As in the rest
of the country, Minnesota’s first cases “were directly
traceable to soldiers, sailors, or [their] friends.”2 Every
military base and military hospital in the MinneapolisSt. Paul area was severely affected. Case isolation was
slowly implemented at both Fort Snelling and the
Dunwoody Naval Detachment (military installations
in Minneapolis). On September 30, the first day of
isolation, cases numbered in the hundreds.3
Influenza cases were not limited to enlisted men
for long. In Minneapolis, the number of civilian cases
outstripped the number of military cases for the first
time on October 9, less than two weeks after the first
case was identified in the state (700 civilian cases; 675
cases at Fort Snelling).4 Influenza had become a reportable condition in Minnesota on October 8 in response
to the growing epidemic.5
MEDICAL RESOURCES
Two major issues contributed to the gravity of the pandemic: the war effort and limited scientific knowledge.
World War I was not only costly, it required much of the
medical community to be stationed overseas. In 1918,
little was known about influenza. While this lack of
knowledge did not negatively impact infection control
actions, effective treatment and prevention methods
were not fully utilized.
When influenza first appeared in Minnesota on
September 27, the state was ill equipped for a health
crisis.2 Although World War I was coming to an end,
more than four million Americans were mobilized and
the nation’s resources were directed to supporting the
war effort. An editorial in the Minneapolis Tribune daily
newspaper described the lack of physicians and nurses:
“The medical fraternity is severely taxed already. So
many physicians and surgeons have gone to Europe or
to training that those at home have more than they can
attend to comfortably and to good advantage.”6
The number of influenza patients that needed the
attention of physicians and nurses overwhelmed St.
Paul and Minneapolis clinicians. The war’s considerable drain on the medical profession was compounded
by other factors that hindered nurse and physician
mobilization. Methods to keep them healthy while
caring for influenza patients were ineffective. Many
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health-care providers fell ill, and some died. At one
point, Minneapolis’s City Hospital reported that “nearly
half of the nursing staff has been ill with influenza in
the last three weeks.”7 This bleak situation discouraged
some clinicians from providing their services. Dr. H.M.
Bracken, Secretary of the Minnesota State Board of
Health, reported to Dr. Rupert Blue, U.S. Surgeon
General, on his campaign to recruit physicians for the
influenza effort: “A number who we have called for
have made excuses and have not come at all.”8 Other
physicians who were recruited by Dr. Bracken simply
did not show up.9
Dr. Bracken attempted to secure senior medical
students for influenza work. Dr. Bracken worked not
only with the U.S. Surgeon General but also with the
Surgeon General of the Army, the Committee on
Education and Special Training, and the Dean of the
University of Minnesota Medical School for three weeks
and still was unable to obtain senior medical students
for assistance, because each party insisted that someone
else had to authorize it. In the end, Bracken failed to
receive any medical students.10
Not surprisingly, Minneapolis and St. Paul hospitals
proved to be inadequate to handle the large number of patients. Minneapolis’s City Hospital and St.
Paul’s St. John’s Hospital were solely devoted to treating influenza patients. Non-influenza patients were
transferred to other area hospitals. This inadequacy
was not entirely due to the lack of beds and supplies;
there simply were not enough healthy nurses. At City
Hospital, Superintendent Dr. Harry Britton reported
that the “hospital was caring for about 150 cases, and
had about 70 on the waiting list. It had beds available
for that waiting number, but not nurses.”11
In St. Paul, a system was set up between St. John’s
Hospital and other hospitals to insure an adequate
number of nurses to care for influenza patients, but
unfortunately this system failed. Dr. F.C. Plondke, St.
John’s Hospital’s Medical Director, complained that
the other hospitals were abandoning their promises
to assign help from their nursing staff. “The other
hospitals had refused to furnish a single nurse to aid
the fifteen who are caring for ninety patients at St.
John’s from their individual nursing staffs.”12
In 1918, medical science maintained that influenza
was bacterial in origin. Physicians at Fort Snelling
claimed that the “bacillus influenza of Pfeiffer,” which
is today known as Haemophilus influenzae, was the cause
of Spanish Influenza.1,13 Nevertheless, despite this lack
of understanding about viruses, advice to curb infection
was relatively accurate. The Minnesota State Board of
Health recommended the use of handkerchiefs to cover
sneezes and coughs, plenty of fresh air, avoidance of the
sick and of crowds, and to contact a physician if ill.14

COMMUNITY DISEASE CONTAINMENT
As influenza was beginning to take hold in the civilian population, there was disagreement between the
Minneapolis and St. Paul health commissioners, Dr.
Guilford and Dr. Simon, respectively. Their approaches
varied; Dr. Guilford tended to be broadly proactive
to prevent cases, whereas Dr. Simon tended toward
initiating activities in response to individual cases. Dr.
Guilford believed that closing public places was the
best course of action and that isolation of individual
cases was useless.15 Dr. Simon asserted that isolation of
influenza cases would be more effective in preventing
the spread of disease.14
The St. Paul Health Department and the Minnesota
State Board of Health met Dr. Guilford’s strong advocacy with opposition. Dr. Bracken, siding with St. Paul,
questioned, “If you begin to close, where are you going
to stop? When are you going to reopen, and what do
you accomplish by opening”?11
Debate between the two cities on the merits of closing schools caused further strain. Dr. Simon held that
St. Paul’s school nurses were the best defense against
the spread of the disease, and that closing schools
would allow cases to go undetected as the children
would not be under any medical supervision. Dr.
Guilford disagreed, pointing out that 30 school nurses
would not be able to adequately care for the 50,000
pupils in the Minneapolis public school system during
a pandemic.16 Minneapolis closed the schools on two
separate occasions (October 12 to November 17, and
December 10 to December 29, 1918).
Despite Dr. Simon’s conviction that the closing of
public places would be ineffective, on November 6 St.
Paul government officials overruled him and enacted
a closing order for the whole city, including schools,
theaters, churches, and dance halls. The St. Paul Citizens’ Committee—consisting of 15 physicians, church
leaders, and community members who were appointed
by Dr. Simon—which was concerned by the record of
218 new cases on November 5, as well as 36 deaths
between November 4 and November 5, 1918, recommended this policy change (Figure 1).17 The number
of new cases began to decline 10 days later, with only
24 new cases, and the next day, Dr. Simon reopened
St. Paul businesses and churches.
Minneapolis and St. Paul both attempted to combat
influenza by limiting crowding in places with restricted
access to fresh air. Both cities enacted streetcar regulations aimed to keep the air in the streetcars fresh by
mandating open windows and limiting the number
of passengers to 84 (streetcars had a seating capacity
of 46).5,17,18 Because the measure limiting the number
of car passengers, implemented on October 26 in St.

Public Health Reports / November–December 2007 / Volume 122

Public Health Chronicles



805

Figure 1. Influenza cases in St. Paul as recorded by the St. Paul Health Department
in the St. Paul Daily News, 1918–1919a

Cases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.

a

Paul, was deemed successful, Minneapolis enacted a
similar regulation on October 30.17 As an experiment,
Dr. Bracken also proposed that St. Paul regulate the
business hours of stores and theaters to keep streetcar
congestion to a minimum. Once again, Minneapolis
followed St. Paul’s example on October 16, 1918, by
regulating the hours of retail stores, office buildings,
and wholesale stores.19
There were several complaints that the mandate in
Minneapolis to keep three streetcar windows open at
all times caused people to get sick due to winter colds.
A compromise was reached by Dr. Guilford allowing
streetcars with heating and ventilation systems to close
their windows once the temperature dropped to 32
degrees Fahrenheit.20
St. Paul also targeted elevators as places where
influenza could easily be transmitted due to the tight
quarters and limited fresh air. Buildings with fewer
than six stories were no longer permitted to use their
elevators.21
Public response to community disease containment
The measures used to contain influenza greatly affected
the day-to-day lives of citizens. While some accepted

the changes imposed on them, others protested regulations that they considered unfair. Some called for more
stringent methods, while others blatantly broke the new
rules that were intended to protect them.
The closing of public places in Minneapolis was
announced in advance, so people rushed to complete
those activities that would soon be banned, resulting
in the very same crowded conditions the ban sought
to prevent. “Downtown theaters were packed last night
with patrons who took advantage of their last chance
to see a performance until the ban is lifted.”22 While
some St. Paul citizens were relieved that Dr. Simon
initially pledged to keep public places open, others
felt this was wrong. “Fear of influenza contagion in
crowded places has reduced the patronage of St. Paul
motion picture theaters by nearly half, according to
reports to Dr. H.M. Bracken.”23
Many sporting organizations responded negatively
to closing orders. For example, in November 1918, the
bowlers of St. Paul drew up a petition that requested
permission to begin bowling again.24 Minneapolis
football teams chose to ignore the ban and attempted
to play against each other in front of large crowds.
Police were called in to disperse the crowds and halt
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the games.25 Minneapolis teams found a way to play
despite the closing order. Because Minneapolis high
school football games were banned, practice games
were scheduled with St. Paul teams.26 Several establishments serving alcohol and food deliberately broke
the closing order to continue their regular business.
“One saloon was discovered with the back door route
open.”27
The elevator regulations in St. Paul were particularly
unpopular. “Some of the downtown hotels objected to
stopping their elevators, saying that they would lose
guests. This caused a change in the ruling to permit
hotel elevators and those in apartment houses to operate.”28 Many insisted it was unhealthy for the sick to
be forced to climb stairs in their impaired state, while
others felt concerned that people would be shut off
from fresh air if they were not allowed to use their
elevators. Consequently, the city compromised and
all elevators were back in use starting November 9,
1918, although only one person per 5 square feet was
permitted.29
The Hennepin County School Board (where Minneapolis is located) was exceptionally defiant to the
closing order. The school board was concerned for the
health of the students as well as the “12,000 dollars a
day” that the closing orders cost because teachers continued to be paid, and extra school days would have
to be added to the school year.30 Against the explicit
orders of Dr. Guilford, and the pleading of several
Parent-Teacher Association officers, the school board
reopened schools on October 21, only to be shut down
on the same day under threat of police action.31
In St. Paul, all influenza cases were supposed to
be reported to a physician, who in turn was required
to isolate the case in his or her own home and notify
the health department. Several problems sprung up
with these requirements that hampered surveillance,
the care of patients, and protecting people from getting sick. For one, both physicians and patients were
often hesitant to bring attention to cases. “Physicians
are not reporting their cases to prevent homes from
being quarantined.”21 (Note: At the time of the 1918
influenza pandemic, the separation of the ill from the
general population, what is now referred to as isolation, was termed “quarantine.”) The ill also sought to
evade isolation in their homes by not seeking medical
attention, or only seeking medical attention when they
became gravely ill. “Hundreds of persons in the city do
not call for medical assistance until the second, third,
or fourth day and in many cases pneumonia already
has developed when medical attention is first given.”29
Staffing shortages made isolation even less desirable.
Because there were a limited number of inspectors to

release houses from isolation, houses were not released
promptly from isolation.32
Starting on November 15, St. Paul telephone operators went on strike. According to the Pioneer Press daily
newspaper, “Less than one third the new cases [are]
being reported to the health department,” as a result
of the telephone strike.33 This strike not only affected
the reporting of cases, but also isolation, as well as their
release from such a measure.
After all of the difficulties involved in establishing
isolation for each case, some flagrantly disobeyed
the isolation orders altogether. “Disregard of the city
quarantine yesterday caused the arrest of one man who
insisted on taking his child from the city hospital before
the patient was ready to be discharged. The mother
and father and the child later were found mingling
with other persons in the neighborhood.”29
INFECTION CONTROL AND VACCINATION
In addition to closing public places and isolating
cases in their homes, both Minneapolis and St. Paul
health departments took other steps to keep people
from getting infected. The use of gauze masks, more
stringent sanitation laws, and vaccination campaigns
were deployed in this effort.
Directions for wearing the masks were issued to the
public. “The outside of a face mask is marked with a
black thread woven into it. Always wear this side away
from the face. Wear the mask to cover the nose and
the mouth, tying two tapes around the head above the
ears. Tie the other tapes rather tightly around the neck.
Never wear the mask of another person. When the mask
is removed . . . it should be carefully folded with the
inside folded in, immediately boiled and disinfected.
When the mask is removed by one seeking to protect
himself from the influenza it should be folded with
the inside folded out and boiled ten minutes. Persons
considerably exposed to the disease should boil their
masks at least once a day.”21 However, there was inconsistent advice on the use of gauze masks. Dr. Bracken,
of the State Board of Health, advocated the wearing
of masks, though he did not wear one himself, saying,
“I personally prefer to take my chances.”34
Medical students working in clinics in each district
of St. Paul distributed gauze masks.12 But the Citizens’
Committee rejected an ordinance requiring the wearing of masks at all times, even though, “All physicians
were united in the opinion that the gauze covering
should be worn in hospitals or in the presence of
doubtful cases.”35 Despite the lack of official orders
requiring the wearing of masks and Dr. Bracken’s
unclear message, many people sought out masks for

Public Health Reports / November–December 2007 / Volume 122

Public Health Chronicles



807

themselves. The Northern Division of the American
Red Cross manufactured tens of thousands of masks.
Minneapolis ordered 15,000 masks from the Red Cross
on October 1, 1918.36 These masks were used by nurses
in schools and hospitals, doctors, hospital visitors, and
those suspected of being infected with influenza.37
As the number of cases increased in St. Paul,
employers sought ways to keep their workers healthy
and productive. Several companies requested masks
to distribute to their workers. Despite the thousands
of masks provided by the Red Cross, still more were
needed to fulfill the demand. The Citizens’ Committee
suggested that companies ask their female employees
to fabricate masks for all their employees.21 St. Paul
introduced new sanitation laws that called for the
sterilization of dishes and cups in restaurants and bars,
and the banning of roller towels and common drinking
cups in public restrooms.38
At least two different vaccines were administered
in Minneapolis-St. Paul, neither of them effective as
neither actually contained influenza virus. One made
by bacteriologists at the University of Minnesota was
purported to prevent pneumonia.39 The Mayo Clinic in
Rochester, Minnesota, made another vaccine that was
intended to prevent both pneumonia and influenza.40
This latter vaccination was composed of Streptococcus
pneumoniae types I, II, and III, S. pneumoniae group
IV, hemolytic streptococci, Staphylococcus aureus, and
“influenza bacillus.”41
Military personnel as well as civilians were inoculated
beginning as early as October 4, 1918.37 Both city health
departments purchased vaccine and distributed it to
physicians at no charge to encourage widespread use.
In Minneapolis, people desiring the vaccine “thronged”
the offices of doctors hoping to be vaccinated, and
in St. Paul it was reported that “thousands of persons
have been inoculated.”39,42 Some physicians took advantage of their access to vaccine and the public’s fear of
influenza. According to St. Paul’s Citizens’ Committee,
it was discovered that “a few physicians were charging a fat fee for inoculations.”29 This was particularly
disturbing as the vaccinations were supplied to the
physicians for free.

asked to volunteer for a health education campaign.
The main goals of the campaign were to get rid of
shared drinking cups, which were the precursor of the
water fountain, as well as the roller towels, which were
used to dry hands after washing.43 St. Paul teachers were
sent “to ascertain the plight of families worst affected
by the epidemic.”28 This was accomplished through a
canvas of homes where the teachers learned if anyone
was sick, needed to see a physician, or needed food.27
St. Paul set up a public kitchen, a children’s home,
and an emergency hospital for these cases.21

COMMUNICATIONS

Table. Minneapolis and St. Paul influenza cases and
deaths, September 30, 1918, to January 6, 1919

Postal workers, Boy Scouts, and teachers were enlisted
to provide educational materials to the public and to
teach health precautions. Mail carriers distributed
educational materials on their routes. Boy Scouts
distributed posters to stores, offices, and factories in
downtown Minneapolis.22 Minneapolis teachers who
were put out of work by the closing of schools were

Limitations
Although the two cities chose different methods of
disease containment, determining which method was
more successful is challenging. Information on cases
in both cities depended on ill individuals seeking the
attention of physicians, who were in short supply. The
physicians were then required to report the number
of new cases each day to their city health department.
The city then reported the total number of cases to
the newspapers, which published the number of new
cases and deaths each day. This chain of information
left much room for error and possible falsification.
Because St. Paul chose to utilize isolation and Minneapolis did not, case reporting varied greatly between
the two cities. Individuals with influenza who had their
status reported in St. Paul had to endure isolation
until they were released with a physician’s approval.
This may have discouraged people from seeking the
attention of physicians, and thus being reported—an
undesired consequence of enforced isolation (Table).
Because those with influenza were not isolated in Minneapolis, more people might have felt comfortable
seeking medical attention. This could explain why St.
Paul had such a high case fatality rate compared with
Minneapolis (Table, Figures 2 and 3).
CONCLUSION
Several factors impede direct comparisons of the two
cities’ approaches. The cities border each other and

Minneapolis
Total deaths
Total cases
Death rate (per 100,000)
Incidence rate (per 100,000)
Case fatality rate (percent)
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747
14,411
264
4,781
5.2

St. Paul
645
4,399
300
2,049
14.7
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Figure 2. Influenza case rates per 100,000, Minneapolis and St. Paul, 1918–1919a

Cases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.

a

residents travel back and forth. Although the containment philosophies differed greatly, in reality St. Paul
government officials overruled public health, and
schools and public gathering places were closed in
both cities for varying lengths of time. Although the
effects of isolation vs. closure of public places cannot
be specifically determined, other lessons can be learned
from what happened in 1918. Many steps could have
been taken to prevent illness and save lives. Prior planning, clear orders, as well as consistent and transparent
advice and information to the public may have made
a significant difference in the number of cases and
deaths due to influenza in 1918.
There was a paucity of planning for a health emergency when influenza first appeared. While the actions
that the two city health departments took to stem the
spread of influenza align closely with current pandemic
plans, health officials had the disadvantage of trying
to conceive and realize plans during a health crisis.
Many current recommendations were implemented,
including the use of masks, the use of vaccines (albeit
ineffective ones), increasing the stringency of sanitation measures, limiting crowding in public places,

and trying to coordinate hospitals, nurses, physicians,
and medical students to maximize resources. As part
of maximizing human resources during an influenza
pandemic, it is imperative that the safety of health-care
workers is insured. The number of nurses and physicians who fell ill and even died as a result of assisting
in the fight against the pandemic scared other nurses
and physicians away.
Had these ideas been generated prior to such a
large emergency, several problems could have been
averted. The debates and disagreements between different public officials and health agencies, as with the
Hennepin County School Board and the Minneapolis
Health Department or between the Minneapolis Health
Department and the St. Paul Health Department, could
have been discussed in advance. Supplies could have
been stockpiled, business leaders and community members could have provided input on controversial disease
containment policies, and medical students could have
been put to work in hospitals and communities that
lacked physicians. Unfortunately, these disputes arose
and continued throughout the pandemic.
Clear authority and management by public health
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officials were generally lacking at the federal and state
levels. It was almost as if the fear of using their authority led Surgeon General Blue and Dr. Bracken to fail
to take decisive action. Surgeon General Blue suggested
to Dr. Bracken, and all other state health officials, “the
advisability [of] discontinuing all public meetings,
closing all schools and places of public amusement…
on appearance of local outbreaks.”44 Because this was
merely a suggestion, and local outbreaks were not
defined objectively, Blue’s urgent telegram had no
effect.
On the state level, Dr. Bracken acknowledged that
the St. Paul Health Department “followed his advice” to
not close public places, and went on to say that St. Paul,
“has the power to do the opposite any time it wants
to.”11 This statement forced local health departments
to define their own rules while attempting to decipher
conflicting messages from the state and federal level.
Because clear orders were not being given to public
health officials, the public in turn was not receiving
transparent and consistent advice and information.
Should the public wear masks? Why was it allowable
to be next to someone in a streetcar and not in an



809

elevator? Why were church services closed while Red
Cross workers gathered in crowded conditions in those
very same churches? Was influenza a life-threatening
condition, or was panic the most dangerous element of
the influenza pandemic? In Minneapolis and St. Paul.
there was no single message on any of these issues.
In many cases, the public had to decide for itself. In
which case, the effect of the messages that were communicated only served to contradict each other.
In reviewing this history, some lessons stand out.
Recent analyses of nonpharmaceutical interventions
during 1918 indicate cities in which multiple interventions were implemented early in the pandemic fared
better.45 Of primary importance is developing a plan
ahead of time that incorporates all levels of government health infrastructure and describes clear lines
of responsibilities and roles. Plans for surge capacity
and community containment must be discussed with
stakeholders and consensus must be achieved.
Further, general approaches should be put forth
for public comment and approval. The public health
benefit of isolation should be weighed against the possibility that some people would be discouraged from

Figure 3. Daily death rates per 100,000, Minneapolis and St. Paul, 1918–1919a

Cases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.

a
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seeking care. Clear explanations of the reason for isolation, generous employer support, and providing food,
medicine, and social service to those in isolation may
mitigate fears and increase cooperation. The public
must also be educated about the reasoning behind
other health measures (i.e., closures), should those
methods be implemented.
Approaches and plans should be based on scientific data whenever possible, and include input from
ethicists. Unlike in 1918, a pandemic influenza vaccine
will likely be available today, albeit four to six months
after the pandemic starts. But similar to 1918, the
challenge will be designing an orderly and ethical
distribution of a scarce commodity. Further, experts in
risk communication should assist in developing messages that are scientifically accurate, understandable,
clear, and useful. Finally, we need to take careful note
of local and national lessons from the past so we do
not repeat them.
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